Sign theory at work: The mental imagery debate revisited by Issajeva, Jelena
584 Jelena Issajeva
Sign theory at work: 
The mental imagery debate revisited
Jelena Issajeva
Chair of Philosophy, Tallinn University of Technology
Akadeemia tee 3, 12618 Tallinn, Estonia
e-mail: jelena.issajeva@gmail.com
Abstract. Th is article attempts to give a plausible explanation to the long-debated 
question about the nature of mental imagery (MI). Th e traditional approach to this 
question is based on the representational paradigm, which, I claim, is misguided. 
Instead of representational aspects of mental imagery, I emphasize the functions of 
mental imagery, the variety of properties that images exhibit in experimental studies, 
and the relations between diff erent characteristics of images, their functions and the 
subject of imagery. Th at is, I propose to account for mental imagery as a sign system, 
consisting of diff erent types of signs. A mental image can contain important properties 
as parts of the complex sign. Th is approach to the explanation of the nature of MI is 
benefi cial, since it suggests the phenomenon of mental imagery, which overcomes some 
long-standing controversies on the issue.
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Introduction
What is a mental image? Th is question remains one of the most debated ones in cognitive 
psychology, cognitive sciences and the philosophy of the mind. On the one hand, it seems 
quite evident that a mental image looks like something, i.e. it is a mental picture. We 
seem to exploit picture-like representations while imagining, remembering or dreaming 
about something. In this vein, Stephen Kosslyn, for example, has experimentally shown 
that mental imagery (MI) indeed has certain spatial and picture-like properties that 
can legitimately be treated as pictures in the mind’s eye (Kosslyn 1980, 1988, 1994; 
Kosslyn et al. 2006). On the other hand, however, we are also forced to admit that mental 
images take propositional forms analogous to languages (Pylyshyn 1973, 2002, 2003, 
2006). Still, as the empirical research results in ambiguous conclusions, the problem 
Sign Systems Studies 43(4), 2015, 584–596
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2015.43.4.13
 Sign theory at work: The mental imagery debate revisited  585
of the nature of MI remains – what is mental imagery really like? Is it a picture in the 
brain, some propositional or verbal string of language-like characteristics or symbols, 
or something else yet?
In this article I am going to argue for that third (and promising) way to analyse 
mental imagery: namely to treat it as a system of signs. Th is paper starts with a brief 
discussion of the underlying assumptions of that approach, setting out the context for 
the problem of MI. Th en in Section 2 I proceed with the explanation for why mental 
imagery is viewed as a sign system. In particular, Section 2.1 explains why a mental 
image can be viewed as a sign, supported by theoretical considerations. Finally, in 
Section 2.2 I argue that sign theory, applied to the analysis of mental images, suggests 
a viable interpretation of the MI phenomenon. In particular, I consider an example 
of an ordinary daydream in terms of a theory of signs. Th e analysis is intended to 
show that the MI phenomenon is better accounted for in terms of signs than in terms 
of pictures or language. My interpretation of mental images suggests an explanation 
of the MI phenomenon that overcomes controversies characterizing the fi eld while 
avoiding typical problems concerning representational theories about MI.
1. The theoretical assumptions
Th e question about the nature of MI is typically based on the search for particular 
(or dominant) formats of mental representation, plus the manner in which this 
representation is formed and further operated on. From such a perspective, two 
main answers to the question of what MI is can be given: either MI is a picture-like 
representation or a language-like representation. It is no surprise that these two theses, 
both infl uential in the research of MI, are somewhat contrary to each other. It is these 
two postulates that underlie most empirical research on the MI phenomenon, either 
explicitly (as in Kosslyn et al. 2003 or Pylyshyn 2002) or implicitly (as in music studies, 
sport studies etc.). It is this irreducible controversy between the two theses that makes 
the MI Debate1 seem almost insoluble.
But what if the question about the ultimate format of mental images or internal 
representations is, in itself, ambiguous? Are the two formats necessarily mutually 
exclusive? Indeed, it seems that we do possess both kinds of mental entities – pictorial/
analogue and propositional/verbal. Why should there be only one kind of MI? Recent 
1 By the Mental Imagery Debate, also called the analogue-propositional debate, I mean the 
ongoing dispute concerning the representational format of MI. Th e analogue, or quasi-pictorial, 
theory holds that images are ultimately picture-like, with intrinsically spatial representational 
properties. Th e propositional account, on the contrary, interprets mental images to be similar 
to linguistic descriptions.
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experimental results also support the conclusion that mental imagery (in a number of 
experimental settings) can exhibit both types of properties, verbal and pictorial (see, 
e.g., Bartolomeo 2002, 2008). How to interpret such fi ndings? Th e understanding of MI 
should not, it seems, be restricted to the plain dichotomy of verbal vs. pictorial. Th ere 
is a signifi cant amount of empirical data clearly showing the existence of motor, tactile 
and auditory properties of mental imagery (Keller 2012; Pascual-Leone et al. 1995; 
Richardson 1995).2 No doubt much of the latter cannot be analysed and explained in 
verbal vs. pictorial terms. Th e discussions concerning the ultimate format of mental 
images fail to explain why experimental evidence on MI is so ambivalent.
Th e assumptions underlying what constitutes the MI phenomenon are, I believe, 
misguided. Instead of the format of mental imagery, one ought to look at the functions 
of mental imagery, the variety of properties that images exhibit in experiments, the 
relations between diff erent characteristics of images and their functions, and the 
subject who employs the MI. 
To investigate MI only from the perspective of its format is to narrow down and 
limit the scope of the research. Th e information that scientists get from controlled 
experiments given the format assumption suggests only partial explanations to MI. 
Th is actually happens when one attempts to explain new empirical evidence. Th e 
experiments directed at investigating a particular format of MI inevitably neglect 
other features, properties, possible explanations and intrinsic relations that might be 
essential parts of the mental phenomenon. Th at is, experiments tend to neglect other 
perspectives on understanding MI. However, if we place the experimental results 
concerning MI into the broader context of properties and relations in which particular 
images were formed and used, we might get more information regarding its nature. 
In other words, the analysis of MI that ceases to be driven by the constraints of the 
representational, or the computational, paradigms3 opens up new possibilities. How 
does MI appear to us? Th at is, exactly how do we experience mental imagery? When 
employing imagery in daily life, one notices that mental representations can have a 
variety of divergent properties: they can have colours, textures, shapes, sizes and so 
on. Or else they abstract from such properties and become something like general 
and more or less indefi nite ideas.
2 See also Plessinger, Anne 2007. Th e eff ects of mental imagery on athletic performance. At: 
http://healthpsych.psy.vanderbilt.edu/HealthPsych/mentalimagery.html.
3 Until recently, it was the computational paradigm that was the leading theory in cognitive 
sciences and widely acknowledged to underlie the representational accounts of MI (see, e.g., 
Kosslyn 1980; Fodor 1975; Glasgow, Papadias 1992, as well as Th omas, Nigel J. T. 2014. Mental 
imagery. In: Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), Th e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 ed.), 
available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/mental-imagery/). Th e main 
adherents of the pictorial-imagery theory explicitly expressed their commitment to the 
computational paradigm (Kosslyn 1980, 1994; Kosslyn et al. 2006).
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How is it possible that we can have both detailed and abstract images, either at 
diff erent times or even occurring in the same experienced MI phenomenon? For 
example, when someone dreams of some future event that has not happened yet, she 
from one perspective engages in an imaginary experience full of details of how the 
event could or would be. On the other hand, part of this complex and multidimensional 
process remains abstract and imprecise. For instance, she might mentally draw the 
connections between various parts of her dreams (say, how she would get at what she 
imagined or dreamed about) in those abstract terms. But she might employ a vivid 
and detailed picture-like image in which she imagines what the fi nal goal of her dream 
looks like. To put it simply, she might experience some parts of her dream in words, 
yet other parts in pictures. Does it mean that her dream ceases to be imaginary, if it 
fails to fully fall within the scope of one of the two dominant formats?
One could say that an ordinary daydream4 might just be the sum of the 
representations of either type. Yet if this were the case, one would encounter diffi  culties 
in explaining the variety of divergent properties engaged in a daydream from the 
perspective of a single format. And even if we for a moment leave aside the limitations 
of a dominant format account of MI, then how can the interconnections between 
diff erent parts, characteristics and properties of the images be explained? Furthermore, 
how is the meaning of the daydream as a whole explained?
It seems that a dream is not just the mere sum of its constituent parts and their 
properties. It has something more, a meaning as a whole; it is something of its own. Th e 
sum total of random presentations is not yet a dream; it will not have the systematic 
structure and meaning required of one. In a similar vein, MI could be treated as a 
complex system of signs and their properties,5 which can be combined and detached 
from one another, associated and manipulated voluntarily by our mind in various 
ways, and so on. Viewing MI as a sign system solves many problems.
It is worth noting that the interpretation of the image in terms of signs is compatible 
with the traditional representational accounts of MI, according to which MI is the 
4 By ‘day-dream’ I mean a voluntary conscious fl ow of images that are not based on the 
respective physical stimuli.
5 Th e defi nition of mental imagery as a “complex system of signs and their properties” needs 
some additional clarifi cation. By ‘system’ I mean here a set of elements and relations that work 
together as a whole and constitute an interconnected network, which is guided by general rules 
of semiosis, i.e. by the signifying process. I call the system ‘complex’, because of the many-
levelled and manifold relations and elements it includes. Firstly, this system of signs has several 
elements: representamen, object, interpretant and subject. Secondly, the system has several 
levels of relations: (1) between the relata; (2) in respect to each element of the sign; (3) in 
respect to the subject. For these reasons I call the sign system “complex”. Finally, the ‘property’ 
is used here in a broader sense to denote various characteristics of signs, such as iconicity, 
indexicality and symbolicity.
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internal representation of a particular format. In other words, both quasi-pictorial 
and propositional accounts focus only on one element of the sign, namely on the 
representamen6 (or the sign vehicle) of the image, thus equating the very image with 
this one element. Th e centre of the analysis and investigation of the image shift s 
to the particular format of the representamen: does it have pictorial properties and 
constitute a picture in the mind, or does it have verbal properties and a propositional 
format? Such analysis necessarily restricts the investigation and understanding of 
the mental-imagery phenomenon, because (1) it takes the image out of the context 
of relations where it was formed and employed; and (2) it neglects the other two 
elements of the image – its object and meaning (which will be discussed later in more 
detail). We cannot truly understand the representamen without understanding the 
object it represents and the meaning that such representation conveys. A full-fl edged 
understanding of the nature of an image is only possible when MI is viewed within the 
complex context of relations between the three relata. In this sense, an interpretation of 
MI in terms of sign systems broadens the understanding of mental imagery, accounted 
solely in terms of representation before.
Yet another diff erence between viewing mental imagery as a sign system in 
comparison with representation lies in the following: the representational account 
of MI sees an image as a stable, more or less fi xed mental entity (be it a picture or 
a word) ready for retrieval and manipulation, whereas the understanding of MI as a sign 
goes beyond that. It views the mental image as a dynamic,7 continuous and changing 
mental entity which can only be accounted for within the context of the relations and 
cognitive processes it is engaged in. Th is complex contextuality of MI means changing 
the nature and the dynamics in the usage of mental imagery to solve cognitive tasks.
2. Mental imagery as a sign system
In order to understand to what extent we can talk about mental images as mental 
signs, it is useful to begin with the brief explanation of what a sign is and how it 
6 Th e fundamental diff erence between the representamen and representation, as considered 
with regard to mental imagery, is that the former is only one part of the triadic sign relation, 
whereas in the latter case, the image is identifi ed only as a representation.
7 Th e terms ‘stable’ and ‘dynamic’ are opposites. By the term ‘stable’ I mean a fi xed, essentially 
unchangeable mental entity whose nature and properties remain the same despite changing 
the context or changing the way of its retrieval. By ‘dynamic’ I mean an open and changeable 
mental entity whose properties change when the context or the relations between its various 
parts are changed.
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functions in the mind.8 According to Peirce,9 a sign is “something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, 
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed 
sign. Th at sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the fi rst sign. Th e sign stands 
for something, its object” (CP 2.228). Th is defi nition uncovers two main aspects of 
a sign: (1) Peirce defi nes a sign through its participation in a semiotic or signifying 
process (i.e. semiosis); (2) and he views a sign as consisting of three relata or three basic 
elements – a sign itself or signifying vehicle or representamen (as Peirce sometimes 
calls it), an object which the sign stands for and an interpretant10 as the meaning of 
the relation between the signifying vehicle and its object. Th e sign, its structure and 
nature, is about the semiotic relations between its three elements.
2.1. Why can a mental image be a sign?
What is the rationale for treating mental imagery as a sign system? Th e main reason to 
account for mental imagery as a sign system and a mental image as a sign, respectively, 
is that the mental image has a trichotomic structure, functions and properties that are 
similar to those of signs. 
Firstly, if we analyse the mental image outside of any particular premise or hypo-
thesis, the very fi rst characteristic that we will notice is the intentionality11 of images. 
In short, an image is necessarily about something, or it is directed towards some object. 
It seems every image (of whatever kind) that the human mind produces is about 
8 Th e question of the signifying nature of mental imagery inevitably leads us to the question 
of the signifying nature of the mind in general. Peirce, for example, held that the mind indeed 
has a signifying nature, i.e. all our mental and cognitive capacities are by means of signs. 
However, the analysis and discussion of this more general claim is outside the scope of the 
present paper.
9 Many sign theories have been suggested (e.g. Saussure, Morris). I focus on Peirce’s for the 
following reasons: (1) Compared to other accounts, Peirce’s is the most developed, elaborate 
and fl exible account of signs and semiosis, and it is compatible with pragmatism. (2) Its 
explanatory power is greater – it can be used for a full-fl edged interpretation and thorough 
analysis of any sign. (3) His system is backed up by his thorough studies in history, logic and 
science. As a result he elaborated classifi cations of signs for the analysis of signs.
10 It is noteworthy that the interpretant, according to Peirce, has a dual nature – it is both a 
meaning and the sign itself (CP 2.228). So, the meaning of a sign also signifi es something for a 
subject, i.e. it is a sign itself.
11 Th e term ‘intentionality’ is overloaded and ambiguous in cognitive sciences and philo-
sophy. Leaving aside detailed discussions about the nature of intentionality or whether it can 
legitimately be ascribed to mental states, I will use this term to denote the “aboutness” of 
mental states, i.e. a mental state as being about something or standing for some object. Th us, I 
take it as an implicit premise that mental states are intentional in the sense stated above.
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something or stands for something. Th us, just as signs, mental images have objects 
that those images represent. Th e object of a mental image need not be previously 
experienced but currently absent. Th e image can concern situations, properties, 
experiences, states or feelings. Images can be detached from external reality in the 
sense of representing, say, non-physical objects of fi ction. But in any case a mental 
image “stands for something” (CP 2.228), i.e. it represents12 an object.
Second, an image also has something that enables it to represent its object. In other 
words, an image should have some sort of a ground element or, in Morris’s terms, a sign 
vehicle. Th e ground of the sign is the element that represents or stands for its object 
in some meaning. Peirce says that “a sign stands for [its] object, not in all respects, 
but in reference to some sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of 
the [sign]” (CP 2.228). He also calls this element a representamen, since this part of 
the sign represents (in the broadest possible sense) its object in some meaningful 
relation. Since an image necessarily stands for some object, it follows that the image 
should necessarily have this ground element which would represent its object. In this 
respect, an image is a sign.
Finally, the relation of representation between sign vehicles and objects of an image 
should be meaningful to the subject of the image. Hence, as a sign, a mental image has 
an interpretant. An image stands for some object in “some respect or capacity” (CP 
2.228). Clearly mental images have content. Th ey convey some meaning from a single 
property to complex networks of signifi cation. When voluntarily using imagery, we 
tend to interpret our mental images as meaning something. Furthermore, it appears 
that even our largely involuntary images – dreams – during sleep can be interpreted 
aft er they have occurred. In this sense every mental image has a meaning, produced 
as a result of (co)relation with its object and interpreted by the subject.
To summarize, a mental image necessarily stands for some object. It also has 
the ground element or representamen that enables the representation of this object. 
And as a result of the correlation between representamen and object, the meaning or 
interpretant of an image is produced. So, a mental image has the same structure as the 
sign and the (general) defi nition of the sign and thus can legitimately be interpreted as a 
sign. Just as a sign, a mental image consists of the three basic elements – representamen, 
object and meaning. Hence, just as a sign a mental image can be defi ned as “something 
which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity”, an image is 
formed and should be interpreted in the context of the signifying (or semiotic) process 
12 It is in this sense that mental imagery is usually associated with the term “mental re-
presentation”. In brief, any representation has an object which it represents. By contrast, the two 
dominant accounts on MI agree about the existence of some sort of representation in the mind 
(i.e. they share the representational paradigm as a premise); what they disagree about is exactly 
how these representations represent their objects, i.e. which format of representation is used to 
represent an object.
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and inside the network of sign relations. Based on these, the basic structure of a mental 
image is schematically depicted in Fig. 1.
Meaning of an image
Mental image Object or situation
Figure 1. Structure of an image.
A characterization of mental imagery as a sign system has far-reaching consequences. 
Th is approach can, I believe, accommodate various properties of mental images into 
one coherent explanatory theory. It can reconcile divergent views and contesting 
empirical evidence and even provide further understanding of cognitive mechanisms 
of MI in the human mind. So far I have described the sign theory in general terms, 
but a closer examination is to view mental imagery as a sign system.
1.2. Analysis of mental imagery in terms of signs: An example
Peirce’s sign theory amounts to a system of various classes of signs, the development 
of which was never fully completed though it occupied much of this time. As a result, 
comprehensive classifi cations of signs were produced. Th e general structure of the sign 
consists of three basic elements. According to Peirce, if we analyse each of the elements 
and the features they might have, we can get ten diff erent classes of signs: “signs are 
divisible by three trichotomies; fi rst, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is 
an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to 
its object consists in the sign’s having some character in itself, or in some existential 
relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its 
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or a sign of fact or as a sign of reason” 
(CP 2.243). Each of the three sign elements – sign (vehicle), object and interpretant – 
are divided into three sub-types. Peirce calls the fi rst of the three trichotomic divisions 
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qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns (CP 2.244), the second icons, indexes and symbols 
(CP 2.247) and the third rhemes, dicisigns and delomes (CP 2.250). Together, the 
relationships between these three trichotomies give rise to the 10 classes13 of signs.
Once applied to analyse MI, this detailed account of sign theory and the ten 
classes of signs suggest a subtle and full-fl edged explanation of the mental-imagery 
phenomenon. I propose to test the hypothesis. Consider the following example of the 
usage of mental imagery in ordinary daydreaming:
Imagine yourself experiencing the scent of a rose in the garden. You go out the back 
door of your house to enter the garden behind the house. You stand on the terrace, and 
while looking on the garden, imagine that you have the sensation of a fl ower scent. You 
don’t yet see the roses, but you feel the subtle, sweet fl ower scent and you recognize 
this scent immediately as being a smell signifying that somewhere near roses grow.
How to analyse this simple daydream? I claim that MI is exhaustively explained 
in terms of signs. Th e example produces a compound image that consists of several 
elements and conveys a complex meaning. First, image as the sign vehicle represents 
an object of a particular quality – a smell. Th us the representamen of the image is 
a qualisign. But exactly what does the smell represent? Th e object of signifi cation in 
the imaginary case stated above is a rose. A subtle and sweet smell is a sign of the 
presence of a rose in the garden. Hence, the rose is an existential actual object that is 
represented in the image. In relation to the object of the image that sign is an index. 
Finally, what is the signifi cation of the image? What does it mean? The immediate 
interpretant that was conveyed by the image is the recognition of the subtle, sweet 
sensation as that of a rose’s smell. Our understanding of the image focuses on the 
qualitative feature (smell) of the object represented (rose). From the sign-interpretant 
relationship we get that the image is a rheme.
Th is is a simple analysis of the example in terms of signs. But Peirce pointed out 
that there are no “pure” types of signs in our ordinary cognition. Usually every sign 
displays some combination of various characteristics. Th us, the analysis of the imaginary 
example continues, and more subtle characteristics and inter-relations between elements 
of the image might be uncovered. Th e sign vehicle also has the properties of a sinsign, 
namely existential properties. Th e quality – smell of a rose – is causally connected with 
13  Initially, the three thrichotomies yield twenty-seven possible classes. But Peirce has 
further phenomenological constraints on how we combine the diff erent elements of the sign. 
As a result, only ten permissible classes remain. In his later work, Peirce expanded the list of 
trichotomies and suggested more complex classifi cations of the signs, such as the sixty-six 
classes of signs. Th is later classifi cation will not be discussed, mainly for two reasons: (1) Peirce 
did not complete that work, and his ideas remained conjectural; (2) the detailed discussion of 
the nature and derivation of classifi cations would in any case fall out of the scope of the present 
paper. My aim is to show that the mental-imagery phenomenon can be legitimately interpreted 
as a sign system.
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the object – a rose. In other words, there is a subtle and sweet smell only if there is a 
rose. Th e existence of an object is the cause of your sensation of the smell. In this sense 
the sign vehicle represents not only as quality (smell) but also as the causal co-location 
(smell-rose). Th us the representamen has the properties of a sinsign.
Further, as regard its object (rose), an exemplary image also has iconic features. For 
example, in my dream I visualize a particular fl ower which resembles the real object 
of the outside world. If so, the object is represented in the image as an icon, since it 
is similar to the real object of the external world in the way it looks, smells or grows. 
When I dream about the rose, I might visualize those particular sizes, shapes, textures 
and colours. Th e image rich in such information possesses iconic features. And at the 
same time, my recognition of the presence of the rose in the garden remains indexical. 
Th e smell of a rose is an index of the presence of a rose: these two facts are interrelated, 
causally connected. If there is the smell of a rose in the garden, then somewhere in 
this garden a rose should grow. 
Finally, the meaning of this imaginary experience can also be manifold. In regard 
to its interpretant an exemplary image can convey not only the immediate meaning 
of olfactory sensation (rheme), but also have an existential interpretant (dicent). Th e 
very fi rst meaning that one will get about the image is, of course, the interpretant of a 
feeling, or as Peirce sometimes calls it, an emotional interpretant. Th e smell of the rose 
is immediately felt when I imagine myself going into the garden. It is directly given, 
immediately felt and recognized by the subject. At this stage this fi rst recognition 
of the particular quality and immediate experience of this quality (the smell in our 
example) is not refl ected upon yet, or as one might put it, is pre-refl ective. Th is is the 
fi rst interpretant of my image, a rheme.
But once I have refl ected upon my immediate sensation of a sweet and subtle smell, 
I realize that if there is (i.e. exists) this sweet and subtle smell of a rose, then there 
also should be a rose itself as the carrier of this quality. Th is is already an analysed 
understanding of the existential relation between quality and object that goes beyond 
immediate meaning. If we accept the refl ected or analysed meaning of the quality 
then the sign signifi es the existence of a particular object (rose). Th us the interpretant 
of an exemplary image can also take the form of the dicent or energetic interpretant, 
namely the interpretant of the existential fact.
Next, the above-described imaginary experience seems to convey further meaning 
that goes beyond emotional and existential interpretants. Th e exemplary image also 
has the features of a delome, the conventional interpretant. Th e imaginary experience 
of feeling the smell of a rose uncovers a rule or habit that lies dormant in the situation. 
In the imaginary example the subject infers the existence of the rose from the presence 
of the particular smell only because he possesses the conventional (and oft en implicit) 
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knowledge14 about where the roses grow, for example. In my dream, I imagined entering 
the garden to feel the smell of a rose, not some other place such as a seashore or a forest. 
Why is that? Because it is a general but fallible rule that roses grow in the garden. Th us, 
the imagined experience of smelling the rose is based on tacit knowledge shared by all. 
Moreover, the algorithm of my imagined actions – to go to the countryside, to enter 
the countryside house, to open the back door into the garden, to enter the terrace – is 
also conventional. It is based on the knowledge where the garden might be located, 
how to enter the garden, what one should do to have an olfactory sensation of a rose, 
etc. Without this tacit knowledge the co-relation of some elements of the image (smell-
rose in our case) would be impossible. Furthermore, a dreaming subject might evoke 
some natural language in his daydream of sensing the smell of a rose. For example, 
verbal language might be used to signify the logical sequence of the imagined actions 
or other details of the dream. In this case, the interpretation of the exemplary image 
has conventional characteristics. 
To sum up, in our example the signifi cation of the object (rose) by the sign vehicle 
(smell) generates a compound meaning which consists of emotional, existential and 
conventional interpretants.
Conclusion
My case study of MI proposes two points: (1) mental imagery can legitimately be 
interpreted in terms of Peirce’s theory of signs; and (2) such an interpretation suggests 
fruitful prospects to understand MI phenomena from new theoretical points of view. 
Th e nature and function of mental images ultimately can, I argue, be understood in that 
wider context of signifi cation procedures, the three relata of the sign and the interesting 
relations between them. Representational paradigms that underlie dominant accounts 
on MI are limited in taking stock of the importance of relational elements.
MI constitutes a complex system of signs. Images exhibit features with complex 
meaning. Th e analysis of an imaginary mental image in terms of signs proposes that 
MI has properties of all three trichotomies of the signifying relata. Moreover, various 
properties of images can co-exist with each other, enabling a coherent and multi-
level analysis of MI. Th ough a further investigation of such an account of MI as a 
sign system is needed, even these preliminary considerations warrant the proposed 
method of analysis.
14 Conventional or implicit knowledge about the world is oft en termed ‘tacit’ in cognitive 
science. Pylyshyn has interpreted imagery experiments (e.g. mental scanning, mental rotation, 
mental mapping etc.) as those guided by tacit knowledge by the subjects experimented on 
about how things would have been if perceived in reality and not just imagined (see, e.g., 
Pylyshyn 2002).
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Теория знаков в действии: снова о дебатах 
по поводу ментальных образов
В статье я стараюсь дать приемлемое объяснение сущности ментальных образов, 
которая была предметом долгих споров. Традиционный подход к этому вопросу основан 
на репрезентационной парадигме, которая, по моему мнению, ошибочна. Вместо 
репрезентационных аспектов ментальных образов я выделяю функции ментальных 
образов, множество различных характеристик, проявляемых ментальными образами 
в экспериментальных исследованиях, а также отношения между разными свойствами 
образoв, их функциями и субъектами образов. Предлагаю рассмотреть ментальный 
образ как знаковую систему, состоящую из разных типов знаков. Так, ментальный 
образ может содержать важные свойства как части комплексного знака. Такой подход 
к объяснению ментальных образов представляется продуктивным, поскольку он 
позволяет разрешить некоторые из давних споров по данному вопросу. 
Märgiteooria toimimises: taas mentaalsete kuvandite debatist
Käesolevas artiklis püütakse anda usutav seletus pikki vaidlusi põhjustanud küsimusele 
mentaalsete kuvandite olemusest. Traditsiooniline lähenemine sellele küsimusele põhineb 
representatsioonilisel paradigmal, mis minu väitel on ekslik. Mentaalsete kuvandite 
representatsiooniliste aspektide asemel rõhutan mentaalsete kuvandite funktsioone, 
eksperimentaalsetes uuringutes kuvandite poolt üles näidatavate omaduste mitmekesisust ning 
kuvandite erinevate tunnuste, nende funktsioonide ja kuvandite subjekti vahelisi suhteid. 
Pakun välja, et mentaalset kuvandit võib vaadelda erinevatest märgitüüpidest koosneva 
märgisüsteemina. Mentaalne kuvand võib sisaldada olulisi omadusi, mis on kompleksse märgi 
osadeks. See lähenemine mentaalsete kuvandite olemusele on kasulik, sest viitab mentaalse 
kujundistiku fenomenile, mis aitab ületada mõningaid kaua kestnud vasturääkivusi sel teemal.
